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INTRODUCTION
“Copyright could . . . stand upon no other foundation, than natural justice and common law.”1
*

Senior Notes & Articles Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment
Law Journal, Volume XXVII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2017.
1
Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 207.
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For decades lawyers, professors, philosophers, and law students have been trapped in an endless, two-sided debate regarding
the justification for copyright law in the United States. On one side
stand the utilitarians, who argue that modern American copyright
law amounts to nothing more than positive law2 in the form of an
economic incentive for authors to express themselves creatively.
Natural law theorists, on the other hand, argue that there is something more substantial behind the current copyright regime—that
copyright is not merely a formulation of positive law, but a recognition of philosophical principles of ownership inherent in the natural
order of the world. Discourse on this subject has resolved little, all
the while exposing flaws for anti-copyright proponents to exploit
along their path toward a complete[ly destructive] public domain.
For this reason, copyright advocates desperately need a new
theory—one that replaces the questionable reliance on John Locke
but also incorporates the economic incentives argued for by the utilitarians. This Note attempts to start that process by rebuilding the
understanding of copyright law from a teleological perspective.
Part I outlines the arguments on both sides of the copyright law
debate, including their weaknesses. Part II introduces an Aristotelian natural law theory, and Part III applies these principles to the
U.S. Constitution. Part III also explores the consequences of thinking teleologically about the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
Finally, Part IV explains how this new perspective both aligns with
current copyright jurisprudence and answers some of the field’s
most vexing questions that are crucial amid a growing anticopyright movement.

2

The term “positive law,” as opposed to “natural law,” typically refers to humanmade legal structures that function as law principally because society recognizes them as
law. See Positive Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In contrast, natural law
is understood as law that reflects a greater, natural ordering inherent in the world. See id.
at Natural Law.
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I. THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. The Utilitarian Argument
The utilitarian argument begins where every philosophical
analysis of copyright law should start. The Copyright Clause gives
authors limited rights in their creative expressions “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science.”3 These rights, William Patry argued in
his copyright treatise, amount to nothing more than a “statutory
tort, created by positive law for utilitarian purposes.”4 To Patry
and his sympathizers, American copyright law is only meant to incentivize authors5 by distributing property rights among them to
exploit for personal monetary gain.6 Without such an incentive, the
continued creation of expressive works in the country would arguably diminish.7
The first objection to the utilitarian theory comes from many of
the authors themselves; simply put, they do not do it for the money.8 The argument that authors would lose the desire to express
themselves creatively flatly ignores the millions of individuals who
devote time and money to their creative outlets for little or no profit. Artists who make a living off their work are few and far between,
but artists nevertheless abound.
3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2016).
5
Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From
Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 779–80 (2009)
(“[The Copyright Clause] embodies the rationale that conferring limited property rights
is the best means of achieving the broader public interest goal of knowledge advancement
and societal development.”). But see EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL,
PROPERTY OUTLAWS 39 (2010) (noting that the “utilitarian calculus reflects an asserted
balance between the need to protect incentives for the creation of new information and
the desire to protect access to a resource whose consumption is nonrivalrous”).
6
Adam Moore & Ken Himma, Intellectual Property, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
ARCHIVE § 3.2 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/
intellectual-property/ [https://perma.cc/64CN-F9ZM] (“Thus control is granted to
authors and inventors of intellectual property, because granting such control provides
incentives necessary for social progress.”).
7
See PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1.
8
For example, Walt Disney’s personal mantra was: “I don’t make movies to make
money—I make money to make movies.” Walt Disney and Brad Bird on Why They Want
to Make Money, BOB SUTTON: WORK MATTERS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://bobsutton.
typepad.com/my_weblog/2014/03/walt-disney-and-brad-bird-on-why-they-want-tomake-money-1.html [https://perma.cc/HE34-Z8L4].
4
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One of the more fundamental objections to the utilitarian
theory of copyright is a rejection of its reliance on economics. Economic theories of law have faced heavy criticism, despite their recent popularity, both generally and in the context of copyright law.9
Political philosopher Michael Sandel outlined two such objections
in his book Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do: “First, [the utilitarian approach] makes justice and rights a matter of calculation,
not principle. Second, by trying to translate all human goods into a
single, uniform measure of value, it flattens them, and takes no account of the qualitative differences among them.”10
Sandel’s second objection is particularly relevant, considering
that the three major areas of intellectual property law—copyright,
trademark, and patent law (all with their own separate underlying
rationales and utilities)—are often flattened together under the
umbrella of “intellectual property.”11 The differences between
them are frequently ignored.12 The fact that these important distinctions are consistently overlooked by utilitarians suggests, as

9

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 260–61
(2009); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (2002)
(“From the economist’s standpoint, a distribution of purchasing power is not efficient or
inefficient or just or unjust. Consequently, in and of itself, nothing bad can have happened
if the distribution of purchasing power between two individuals changes. That cannot be
the evil the law seeks to remedy. For an economist, the evil must be that unless relief is
given, someone will incur some unnecessary cost.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299 (1988); Katie Sykes, Toward a Public
Justification of Copyright, 61 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003); Wong, supra note 5, at 780
(“‘Incentive theory’ and a wholly economic analysis of copyright law do not fully explain
all the principles that form part and parcel of modern copyright law, and do not easily
accommodate the influence of other theories, such as the natural rights theory . . . .”).
10
SANDEL, supra note 9, at 260.
11
See, e.g., Moore & Himma, supra note 6, § 2. See generally Rufus C. King, The
“Moral Rights” of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 267
(1991).
12
See infra Section III.B. The Supreme Court often refers to the “useful arts” and—a
term meant for the patent context—in the context of copyright. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince,
714 F.3d 694, 705 (2013); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (improperly referring
“inventors,” in addition to the “useful arts,” in the copyright context).

2017]

LOCKING OUT LOCKE

617

others have, that the utilitarian theory is not concerned with justice
at all, but only with efficiency.13
Even if the merit in the economic perspective is assumed, the
incentive argument does not align with the current copyright
framework.14 Arguments for the efficiency of an incentivization
scheme in copyright law do little to explain why artistic endeavor
should be encouraged in the first place.15 More importantly, any
incentive facilitated by the current copyright regime ought to be an
incentive to share, not merely to create.16 Countless scholars have
explicitly stated that U.S. copyright law persists to incentivize creation.17 However, any author is free to stubbornly sit on her creations and refuse to share her insights with the public. If she does sit
on them, copyright laws may be of no use to her. The focus should
therefore be on sharing, and not on creating. The utilitarians, busy
with their calculations, have largely overlooked this important distinction. Those who recognize the importance of sharing creative
expressions, not just making them, argue that the incentives provided by U.S. copyright law ensure that more and more information is added to the public library.18 Nevertheless, this argument
misses a fundamental problem exposed by Professor Justin Hughes
13
James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (2002)
(“Those who try to explain the law in terms of economics do not concern themselves
with justice but with efficiency.”).
14
Wong, supra note 5, at 780 (“‘Incentive theory’ and a wholly economic analysis of
copyright law do not fully explain all the principles that form part and parcel of modern
copyright law, and do not easily accommodate the influence of other theories, such as the
natural rights theory . . . .”).
15
See Rufus C. King, The “Moral Rights” of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 267, 271 (1991) (“To say that the legal right to prevent others from
exploiting one’s intellectual property is an ‘economic right’ does not mean that it is not
also a moral right.”).
16
Cf. Gary Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society’s Primacy in
Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 383–84 (1985)
(discussing the differences in a copyright system that promotes “production” and one
that promotes “access”).
17
See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 16, at 383 (“A copyright serves as an incentive; it
fosters creation.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1109 (1990) (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded referential
analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative
process.”).
18
See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 16, at 384 (“Society must have access to literature, of
course, to gain the benefit of increased production.”).
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in his seminal article on copyright philosophy: “If the new wealth
remains the private property of the laborer, it does not increase the
common stock.”19
The utilitarian’s incentive argument is further weakened by the
copious social and legal restraints on copyright owners.20 If the reward for artistic creation is the right to exploit her work for financial gain, why is that right undercut by fair use jurisprudence, the
first sale doctrine, and term limits, among others? What incentive
is there for photographer Patrick Cariou to continue crafting his art
if courts are simply going to allow appropriation artist Richard
Prince to make the slightest of changes and sell the same prints for
an exponentially higher profit?21 What reason do textbook publishers have to continue investing in education materials under the ruling in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons?22 Furthermore, if incentivization is the only impetus for copyright law, then rights in intangible property ought to protect works forever, just as rights in real
property do.23
Most damaging to the utilitarian argument is the existence of
moral rights in both U.S. and international copyright law. Calling
them “moral rights” single-handedly suggests that more than mere
calculations toward efficiency justify copyright.24 For example, the
Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”) gives authors a right of attribution by which they can demand recognition as the work’s original author even after the work and its underlying copyright have
been sold.25 The right of attribution has little, if anything, to do
with exploiting the right for financial gain. After the sale, the author who exercises her moral rights has already received her re19

Justin Hughes, supra note 9, at 299.
See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 39, 41.
21
See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.
2013).
22
See infra Section IV.C. for a discussion of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct.
1351 (2013).
23
There is some disagreement as to whether copyright and other forms of intellectual
property confer “property” rights on their owners. See infra Section III.B.
24
See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 520 (1990) (arguing that frequent decisions in controversial copyright
cases often make no mention of economic considerations which suggests that “something
besides economics influences copyright decisions”).
25
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
20
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ward. In fact, monetary remedies are prohibited when recovering
under the right of attribution; the only recourse available remains
an injunction.26 Either utilitarianism does not account for the entirety of the copyright regime or moral rights are unjustified under a
framework built strictly to incentivize.
B. The Lockean Argument
John Locke’s explanation of traditional property rights has become the classical argument for the justification of intellectual
property rights in the United States.27 His theory for property
ownership begins with an individual’s body.28 When a man mixes
his labor with the natural world, the argument goes, his labor “adds
value to the goods, if in no other way than by allowing them to be
enjoyed by a human being.”29 Through this process, man comes to
own the commonly held natural goods upon which he expends his
energy.30
In truth, the Lockean argument seems overly fantastical. As Jeremy Waldon points out, “the idea of mixing one’s labor is incoherent—actions cannot be mixed with objects.”31 That is not to say
that metaphysics has no place in legal philosophy. Rather, the problem is that Locke’s argument is a decidedly physical one.32 Locke
meant to justify real property, not intangible property. Any possi26

See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 55–56
(1st Cir. 2010). Similarly, plaintiffs suing under the right of integrity typically only receive
injunctions if the work is one of “recognized stature.” Id. at 53 n.13. Even in instances
where damages are awarded, they are done so in order to make whole the author’s
damaged reputation, not to recapture profits lost from a stolen opportunity to exploit the
work. See § 106A(a)(2) (specifying that moral rights are available to prevent damage to
the author’s “honor or reputation”).
27
See King, supra note 15, at 284; see also PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1.
28
King, supra note 15, at 285.
29
Hughes, supra note 9, at 297; see also King, supra note 15, at 284; Moore & Himma,
supra note 6, § 3.3 (“When an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes
infused in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot be
separated.”).
30
See Moore & Himma, supra note 6, § 3.3 (“The intuition is that the person who
clears unowned land, cultivates crops, builds a house, or creates a new invention obtains
property rights by engaging in these activities.”).
31
Id. § 3.3.1.
32
See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
891, 896 (2006).
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bility that he intended to apply labor theory to copyright law or
other forms of intangible property is foreclosed by what he said
about authors.33 Real property, unlike its intellectual counterpart,
can be physically possessed, the implications of which ought not to
be ignored in an attempt to understand the rationale for private intellectual property rights. And, as at least one commentator has
pointed out, the codification of copyright law into positive statute
arose out of the difficulty of applying common law to items “unpossessable as a matter of natural law.”34 The nail in the coffin is
hammered home by the fact that Locke tasked himself with justifying the distribution of limited resources in order to avoid a tragedy
of the commons.35 In the realm of creative expression, resources
are not limited in the same way,36 so there is no need to construct a
theory that avoids such a problem.37
As with the utilitarian argument, the Lockean argument too has
trouble aligning itself with modern American copyright law. Sympathizers argue that copyright protection is granted as a result of
the value created by an individual’s mixture of labor and land.38 But
this does not explain why even valueless works are given copyright
protection.39 Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of original works of
authorship are created every year and never purchased by anyone.
33

See id. at 896, 898–905.
Yen, supra note 24, at 551.
35
See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownerhip, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 5 (Sept.
6, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ [https://perma.cc/GV5J-NGZR]
(outlining perspectives on the Tragedy of the Commons, including Locke’s conclusion
that even the laborer who owns no private property benefits from a privatized economy).
36
Robert Cunningham, The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons: A
Cultural Environmental Perspective, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 19 (2010) (“The unique
nature of information means that there is no need to allocate its use since there is no
danger of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ as the information commons simply cannot be
overgrazed.”); see also PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that because
there is no risk of over-distributing an idea, “more than one individual can share a single
good simultaneously with others, and with no danger of depriving anyone else”).
37
Cunningham, supra note 36, at 26 (“Given [that information is not a scarce
resource], the legal structures and policy discourse that surround information should also
be different.”).
38
Hughes, supra note 9, at 297; see also King, supra note 15, at 284; Moore & Himma,
supra note 6, § 3.3 (“When an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes
infused in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot be
separated.”).
39
Hughes, supra note 9, at 309; see Yen, supra note 24, at 520.
34
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Under a Lockean theory, such works would be afforded no protection. Never mind that assessing the value of a creative work is wildly subjective; it is not the province of the law to pass judgment on
artistic merit.40
The labor theory of copyright would logically entail that effort
always creates property. Current copyright jurisprudence, however, does not embrace that conclusion. Two basic requirements of
the Copyright Act of 1976 dispel the idea that labor alone creates
property. First, works must be “original” in order to earn the statute’s protection.41 In short, the Act demands that creative works
display a “modicum of creativity” in order to earn its protection.42
Generic expressions of naturally existing items earn no protection,
no matter the amount of effort invested in the expression’s development. Lockeans suffered a serious blow in this regard in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., where the originality requirement flexed its muscles.43 The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the “sweat of the brow” argument presented by the plaintiff, the manufacturer of a phone book copied by a competitor.44
The Court described sweat of the brow as a combination of labor
and “public domain materials,” a description dangerously similar
to Locke’s labor theory.45 Copyright protection on the basis of
sweat of the brow alone, the Court held, “distorts basic copyright

40

See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge.”).
41
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
42
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
43
See id.
44
Id. at 359–60 (“In summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt
that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in
directories and other fact-based works. Nor is there any doubt that the same was true
under the 1909 Act.”).
45
Id. at 354; see also id. at 352–53 (citing Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub.
Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (1922)).
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principles . . . without the necessary justification of protecting and
encouraging the creation of ‘writings’ by ‘authors.’”46
Second, the Copyright Act also requires works to be sufficiently
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.”47 For example, a song
existing only in the mind of a musician earns no copyright protection until it is recorded or written down, no matter how many
hours the musician spent crafting it in his head.48 The finding that
the fruits of the mind receive no protection has been settled law for
more than 130 years. The Supreme Court articulated the rationale
for the idea/expression dichotomy, which is now codified in federal
law,49 in the 1879 case Baker v. Selden.50 The plaintiff’s book describing a method of accounting enjoyed no copyright protection,
the Court concluded, because “[w]here the truths of a science or
the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world,
any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the
other, in his own way.”51 Mixing labor with “common property,”
the Court seems to have said, is not enough on its own to create a
property right.52
Even these two most basic elements of modern copyright law,
originality and the idea/expression dichotomy, cannot make room
for Locke. Nevertheless, natural law theorists continue to cling to
Locke as if he is at the helm of a lifeboat.53 But the death of Locke’s

46

Id. at 354 (quoting 1-3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1990)).
47
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
48
See id.
49
Id. (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”).
50
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
51
Id. at 100–01.
52
See id.
53
Some scholars have advocated for a third, personality-based theory that relies on the
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. See generally Hughes, supra note 9. But this theory, too,
suffers from similar problems, and Hughes has argued that it only makes sense when
combined with Locke’s labor theory. Id. at 329. It is an interesting theory, but it suffers
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labor theory does not preclude a natural justification for the American copyright framework. Of all the natural law philosophers,
Locke is but one. The idea that America’s Founding Fathers were
influenced by no other natural law philosophers is unsupported.
The remainder of this Note therefore attempts to find a new natural copyright law. This time, the man at the helm of the lifeboat is
one whose ideas have endured much longer than, and may have
even influenced, Locke.54 He is the man Thomas Aquinas (“The
Naturalist”) referred to as The Philosopher, and whom many consider one of the original sources of natural law: Aristotle.55
II. ARISTOTLE’S TELEOLOGY
A. Introduction to Teleology
Justice in the eyes of Aristotle meant treating equals equally and
unequals unequally.56 In other words, it meant giving each person
his due.57 But how does one determine what each person is due? As
Sandel explains, it depends on what is being distributed.58 Aristotle’s famous example asked a simple question: Who should play
the best flutes?59 The best flute players, of course.60 Sandel explained:
Justice discriminates according to merit, according
to the relevant excellence. And in the case of flute
playing, the relevant merit is the ability to play well.
It would be unjust to discriminate on any other ba-

from the same fantastical problems as Locke’s theory. Furthermore, it does not answer
the question of why legal imprimatur ought to be given to embodiments of personality.
54
See SUSAN FORD WILTSHIRE, GREECE, ROME AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12–13 (1992)
(noting that Locke referred to Aristotle’s focus on the rational “exercise of the mind” as
the “special capacity of human beings”).
55
Id. at 13.
56
ANTHONY WALSH & CRAIG HEMMENS, LAW, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY 29 (4th ed.
2016).
57
See TONY BURNS, ARISTOTLE AND NATURAL LAW 91 (2011).
58
SANDEL, supra note 9, at 187.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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sis, such as wealth, or nobility of birth, or physical
beauty, or chance (a lottery).61
The conclusion that the best flute players should play the best
flutes is derived through teleological thinking. In order to determine each individual’s rights in social institutions one must first
uncover the “purpose, end, or essential nature” of the issue at
hand.62 Aristotle referred to the purpose, end, or essential nature of
a thing as its telos.63 Thinking teleologically, therefore, allows one
to consider the true nature of a thing—a practice, a custom, or an
institution—in order to craft laws that best fulfill that practice, custom, or institution’s purpose.64
Teleological thinking in modern times is not uncommon, even
in the law.65 A recent movement for the reinstitution of Aristotle in
contemporary law argued that “the final end of law is to promote
human flourishing—to enable humans to lead excellent lives.”66
Such an aretaic theory—named after the Greek word for excellence, arête—puts virtue and teleology back at the center of law.67
Instead of defending modern legislative proposals on economic
bases alone, an aretaic theory of law harmonizes efficiency and natural law by harnessing economic arguments as a means for constructing laws aimed at achieving the natural telos of a given regulatory framework.68 The realm of private law in particular, which today includes copyright law, is better understood by an Aristotelian
approach.69 Instead of constructing property rights from outside
61

Id.
Id. at 186.
63
Id. at 188.
64
THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS xix (William P. Baumgarth &
Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 2002) (“The
central theme of Aristotle’s metaphysics is that the natures of things determine their type
of activity, and, conversely, that their specific type of activity indicates the things’
natures.”).
65
See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.
2012) (“That one comprehends law through its goals . . . is particularly well entrenched in
American legal scholarship.”).
66
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 2 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2007).
67
Id. at 3.
68
See Gordley, supra note 13, at 2 (“Private law is better explained by the concepts
central to the [Aristotelian tradition] such as preference satisfaction and economic
efficiency as the economists understand them.”).
69
Id.
62
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the social system, and then applying them to society and its positive laws as Locke sought to do,70 Aristotle’s property theory intertwines positive laws with the natural world and its aim for human flourishing in society.71
B. Distributive Justice
Determining what each person is due is a matter of what Aristotle called “distributive justice.”72 It is in this context that he disagreed with Plato over how to distribute private property: Plato argued that society is best served when property is held in common
so that all individuals can contribute to it and reap its benefits.73
Aristotle pointed out that social progress is better achieved through
private ownership.74 After all, property held in common is often the
least cared for.75 Without private ownership, no one would have an
incentive to work, improve, and care for their property.76 The public benefits from resources cultivated by private citizens.77 Human
flourishing, Aristotle argued, is therefore achieved by giving each
individual a personal stake in the success of the whole group.78
It may be easy to assume that Aristotle intended to distribute all
things equally—that is, that all persons should receive the same
distributions. This is not the case. Distributive justice is not equal
70

See WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 14–15 (stating that Locke’s labor theory
“logically preceded an established political system”); King, supra note 15, at 285.
71
See WEINRIB, supra note 65, at 4 (“The goal-oriented understanding of private law
follows from the seemingly axiomatic proposition that the object of the law is to serve
human needs.”).
72
WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 29–30 (“Distributive justice relates to how a
political entity such as a nation-state distributes resources to its members.”).
73
See Waldron, supra note 35, § 2 (“Plato . . . argued that collective ownership was
necessary to promote common pursuit of the common interest, and to avoid the social
divisiveness that would occur ‘when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the
same happenings.’” (citing PLATO, REPUBLIC, bk. V, § 462b (C.D.C. Reeve ed., G.M.A.
Grube trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1992) (c. 380 B.C.E.))).
74
Id. (“Aristotle responded by arguing that private ownership promotes virtues like
prudence and responsibility: ‘[W]hen everyone has a distinct interest, men will not
complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be
attending to his own business.’” (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, § 1263a (C.D.C.
Reeve trans. Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (c. 350 B.C.E.))).
75
See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 20.
76
See Gordley, supra note 13, at 3.
77
See id.
78
See Waldron, supra note 35, § 2.

626

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:613

in amount, but equal in proportion according to what each individual deserves.79 For example, “[t]wo people may have identical
needs, but one of them may deserve a much greater proportion because of his or her contributions to the community.”80
On this bedrock of teleology and distributive justice, the next
Part considers the natural telos of American copyright law and its
implications for the positive laws that were crafted for it even before the birth of the nation.
III.

REBUILDING COPYRIGHT

A. Copyright Teleology
It is one thing to argue for a legislative framework based on teleological thinking. It is another to put that into practice. In particular, the question here asks for the telos or purpose U.S. copyright
law is meant to serve. Fortunately, the Constitution’s framers
largely answered this question: “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”81
The telos here is clear: Copyright laws aim to “promote the
progress of Science.”82 The term “Science” in 1789 carried a
slightly different meaning than it does today. It was not meant to
refer to science in the literal sense, but rather simply as the general
advancement of knowledge.83 For the sake of clarity, this Note refers to the progress of Science as the progress of knowledge.
It is worth pointing out that the terms “Science” and “useful
Arts” in the Copyright Clause carry two entirely distinct meanings.
Science is meant to be governed by the copyright regime, and useful Arts by the patent regime.84 A quick glance at the structure of
79

WEINRIB, supra note 65, at 62, 66.
WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 30.
81
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82
Id.
83
Giles Sutherland Rich, The “Exclusive Right” Since Aristotle, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 217,
224 (2004).
84
Id.
80
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the Copyright Clause reveals its symmetry: The “Progress of
Science” is carried out by “Authors” through their “Writings,”
and the “Progress of useful Arts” by “Inventors” through their
“Discoveries.”85
This is an important point for understanding how copyright
laws should be construed. As discussed, the copyright framework is
meant to foster the advancement of knowledge, not utility. Unfortunately, this distinction between knowledge and utility has gone
overlooked throughout the years, even by the Supreme Court.86
And, as several scholars have pointed out, these and others of the
courts’ mistakes have contributed to a significant misunderstanding of copyright in general and, more importantly here, in its application toward the directive it serves.87 To be clear, no discussion of
copyright, whether in law review articles, courts, or on the floor of
Congress should include the words “useful Arts,” “Inventors,” or
“Discoveries.” Copyright law is not a tool for increasing utility.
That directive and the above terms are served by the patent regime.
Returning to the telos of copyright law, the advancement of
knowledge may seem like an unfulfilling answer on its own. For
what purpose? Surely the framers thought greater understanding to
be important to society in general. To Aristotle, the advancement
of knowledge is crucial for human flourishing.88 Virtue of thought,
together with virtue of character, leads to wisdom, without which
“one cannot determine right action.”89 It is virtuous thought, the
progress of knowledge, Aristotle said, that facilitates human flourishing.90
It is quite possible that the framers of the Constitution meant to
promote the advancement of knowledge for its own sake. However,
the language the framers used, together with the history of natural
philosophy that influenced them, both support the argument that
85

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See cases cited supra note 12.
87
See generally Kauffman, supra note 16.
88
See Chapin F. Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71
U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 285 (2009).
89
Id.
90
See id.
86
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the framers intended the Constitution to function as a means for
the advancement of an Aristotelian concept of human flourishing.91
Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are
replete with ambitious language aimed at creating a prosperous and
propitious society. The Declaration of Independence, for example,
considered separation from Great Britain to be necessary under the
“Laws of Nature” in order to build a new government “most likely
to effect [the People’s] Safety and Happiness.”92 Likewise, the
preamble to the Constitution, penned thirteen years later, stressed
the desire to form a “perfect Union,” to “establish Justice,” and
to promote the “general Welfare” of the country’s citizens.93 The
framers’ inclusion of copyright protection in the foundation of the
government should be viewed as neither accident nor convenience;
its own aim rightly points in the direction of the even higher goal of
promoting human flourishing.94
In her book Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights, Professor Susan
Ford Wiltshire traced these ideas back to Ancient Greece, and to
Aristotle in particular.95 These natural law principles expressed by
the framers, Wiltshire argued, reflect their search for human flourishing.96 Justice Louis Brandeis also recognized the framers’ intentions in his concurring opinion in the 1927 case Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the
final end of the state was to make men free to develop
91

See id. at 281 (arguing that the legal theory embodied in the Constitution is built “on
the norms of virtue”); see also Yen, supra note 24, at 522–29 (tracing the development of
copyright law from Roman times to the present day).
92
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776).
93
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
94
The framers’ certain familiarity with Great Britain’s Statute of Anne—perhaps the
world’s first piece of copyright legislation—suggests that the choice to forego the need
for legislation and instead embed copyright protection into the government’s bedrock was
a deliberate one. See Yen, supra note 24, at 527–29 (discussing the impact of the Statute of
Anne on early American copyright theory).
95
See generally WILTSHIRE, supra note 54.
96
Id. at 184 (“When traced to their earliest origins, the [ideas and practices that
formed the Bill of Rights] represent the yearnings of people over a period of two and a half
millennia for better ways of living together and for civic arrangements that bring those
hopes to reality . . . . It was belief in natural law that undergirded the claims of the framers
to the rights articulated in the first ten amendments.”).
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their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and
that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.97
The Copyright Clause, as an indispensable element of the Constitution, is therefore best understood not as a means for the advancement of human knowledge alone, but as a means for building
a government that can continue to improve the human condition.
B. The Harmony of Positive and Natural Law
The idea that federal copyright law is only meant to incentivize
authors for its own sake ignores these crucial implications about
human fulfillment and knowledge. This is not to say that there is no
room for positivism in the law. Aristotle differentiated between
positive law and natural law, but thought them both necessary.98 In
his terminology, certain rules are recognized not as the ultimate
aim of the law, but as a means for achieving it.99 These rules, which
Aristotle called the nomoi, take the shape of positive laws that
create the conditions for society to flourish.100 Economic incentives
and arguments for efficiency therefore have their place in a community striving to advance human flourishing.101 It is not difficult
97

274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188; WILTSHIRE, supra note 54, at 12 (“Thus, for Aristotle,
natural law has an existence apart from the conventional or positive laws that human
beings enact to deal with matters of every day justice.”).
99
Gordley, supra note 13, at 291–92.
100
Id.; see also Cimino, supra note 88, at 288, 292.
101
See SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188; Gordley, supra note 13, at 291–92.
98
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to imagine that the best way to achieve a given institution’s telos is
sometimes met through ideals of efficiency. The mistake is in
thinking that efficiency is the only means by which to govern.
The beauty of an Aristotelian view of copyright law is that it not
only incorporates positivism, but also some of the more consistent
aspects of traditional copyright naturalism. For example, Aristotle’s proportional distribution of goods according to what individuals deserve coincides with Locke’s labor theory, by which individuals acquire property rights according to the effort—the contributions—they put into developing valuable social resources.102 By
harmonizing the positive and natural law as Aristotle does, one can
properly understand copyright as an articulation of natural principles (the advancement of knowledge for the sake of human flourishing) to be carried out by positive law (through, for example, the
Copyright Act and the judicial decisions that interpret it).103 A
means for the practice of virtuous thought, copyright is meant to
serve as a guidepost on the path to social wisdom, enabling people
to engage with one another intellectually in order to recognize and
remedy unjust laws and cultural norms.104 The next section of this
Note considers how best to understand this harmony of natural and
positive law and put it into practice.
C. Copyright Protection as a Means Toward an End
Understanding copyright law as a harmony of natural and positive law only takes the argument so far. To understand how it is
meant to promote human flourishing, it is necessary to first consider what copyright law is meant to protect. The Constitution’s reference to “writings” has largely been understood to mean that
copyright protects original artistic expression in a multitude of
102

See King, supra note 15, at 286 (“Differential treatment of similarly situated
individuals is justifiable when the individuals deserve to be treated differently.”).
103
WILTSHIRE, supra note 54, at 184 (“For individuals to live together happily in
communities requires a compromise between freedom and order. The Bill of Rights
achieved this balance because of the two intellectual traditions that combined to give it
birth: the natural law tradition, with its earliest origins among the Greeks, and the positive
rule of law that is the gift of Rome.”); see also Yen supra note 24, at 528 (concluding that
copyright developed as a combination of natural law and economic principles).
104
Leval, supra note 17, at 1109 (“The copyright law embodies a recognition that
creative intellectual activity is vital to the well-being of society.”).
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forms.105 Original expression in the case of a novel, for example,
entails more than mere words on a page. Thus, the copyright in Albert Camus’ The Stranger protects the physical copy of the book or
the arrangement of words.106 However, copyright ought to be seen
as also protecting the idea for which the book stands—the dangers
of apathy, perhaps—in exactly the way that Camus chose to express that idea.107
Copyright should be understood as protection not just for the
physical expression but for the idea embodied in that particular expression.108 Such protection has limits,109 but the point is that only
with such an understanding can the American copyright system
promote the advancement of knowledge, as the framers intended.
It is a purely practical matter: In order for an expressive work to
contribute to social discourse, the idea’s embodiment must be
identified and protected. Commentary on, criticism for, and education of that idea is essential for the development of human understanding.110 However, such commentary and criticism is only effective when that which is commented on is first clearly articulated
and understood. Only then can those ideas be acted upon, modified, and enacted.
This explains why the United States has begun to recognize
rights of integrity in copyrighted works that other countries have
recognized for years. Copyright’s protection of more than the
words on a page, for example, is a relatively new concept in U.S.
105

See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)
(concluding that Congress has understood the copyright clause to grant protection for
“the ideas in the mind of the author [which] are given visible expression”).
106
See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage Books
1989).
107
Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the
Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 517–18 (1995) (“An original [work] is
generally viewed as ‘the one and only perfect embodiment of that work which cannot be
matched even by the best reproduction’ and thus is the only source of ‘complete artistic
enjoyment.”).
108
Id. at 513 (pointing out that French courts, which borrow from similar natural law
foundations in their own copyright jurisprudence, do not think of a work of art as simply
an object, but as “an embodiment of its creator’s thoughts and personality”).
109
See infra Section IV.E.
110
Leval, supra note 17, at 1109 (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that
impeded referential analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle
the creative process.”).
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copyright jurisprudence. However, it is central to copyright systems throughout Europe.111 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
ratified by most of Europe and the United States,112 provides protection to authors for the ideas embodied in their expressive works
even after the copyright for those works has been transferred to
another.113 The United States ratified the Berne Convention in
1988114 and, two years later, passed VARA, giving visual artists,
among other things, the right to prevent any “distortion, mutilation, or modification” of their work.115 Although the mechanism of
VARA functions by focusing on the author’s “honor or reputation,” the right of integrity nevertheless provides the means by
which the copyright system protects the ideas embodied in creative
works for the sake of human flourishing.116 Much like Aristotle argued that giving individuals a personal stake in the common good
ensures proper care for the goods of the world,117 the right of integrity carries the heart of copyright law in that it gives authors a personal stake in the dissemination and discussion of new ideas. Just as
only the best flute players fulfill the purpose of the best flutes, the
authors of original works are the best individuals to care for their
works in ways that fulfill the purpose of greater collective understanding.
Some critics argue that intellectual property rights are not
property rights at all.118 The distinction is largely semantic, but it is
111
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 449 (4th
ed. 2015) (stating that moral rights are a “central and distinguishing feature of the
continental European copyright tradition”).
112
Reddy, supra note 107, at 519.
113
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention] (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”).
114
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
115
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
116
See id.
117
See supra Section II.B.
118
See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1 (“Copyright in the United States is not a
property right, much less a natural right. Instead, it is a statutory tort, created by positive
law for utilitarian purposes: to promote the progress of science.”).
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worth noting that a right is a property right in so much as it is relational and exclusive: relational in that it dictates how individuals
interact with one another,119 and exclusive in that all property
rights can be summarized simply as a right to exclude.120 To illustrate the latter, the most commonly sought after remedy in copyright litigation is an injunction, which, in the realm of intangible
property, is rightly akin to a prohibition against trespass.121
Whether it is called a property right or not, giving artists a personal stake in the advancement of knowledge is rightly viewed as an
incentive to contribute. Lockeans are therefore wrong to entirely
dismiss the incentive argument. The key difference between this
approach and the utilitarian approach is that the latter treats incentivization as both the means and the end of the copyright regime.122
Utilitarians often ignore the existence of moral rights, such as the
right of integrity, in their claims for expedience and efficiency (but
never in their arguments for justice as an end of its own).123 As
Sandel explains, Aristotle’s conclusion that the best flute players
ought to play the best flutes goes beyond purely utilitarian perspec-

119

See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 4–5 (describing property rights as “a cluster of
background rules that determine what resources each of us has when we come into
relations with others and, no less important, what ‘having’ or ‘lacking’ a resource entails
in our relations with these others” (internal citations omitted)).
120
See generally Rich, supra note 83. See also Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property? 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 41–42 (2005) (“In the context of tangible property rights, the
courts have never demanded that a person be deprived physically of his property as a
necessary prerequisite for finding a violation of property rights . . . it is sufficient that one
lose the ability to use, control or dispose of the values that one has created. It is this
concept of property that explains why copyright is in fact property, rather than monopoly
privileges meted out to authors at the leisure of the state’s utility calculation.”).
121
See Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright
Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 39, 59 (1998)
(differentiating between property remedies and liability remedies in copyright law).
122
See PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1.
123
For example, William Patry argues in his introduction to the philosophical
underpinnings of copyright that copyright is not a natural right but a tort created by
statute. Id. Nowhere in his argument does Patry ask whether creating a statutory right is
the right thing to do. See also Gordley, supra note 13, at 5; Yen, supra note 24, at 520
(“[C]opyright protects works whose creation does not depend on the economic incentive
of copyright. In fact, courts frequently decide controversial copyright cases with no
explicit consideration of the economic consequences. This implies that something besides
economics influences copyright decisions.”).
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tives, though it acknowledges their importance.124 Similarly, the
distribution of exclusive rights under the copyright regime must
come from the purpose of the law to bring about justice. Only then
is it possible to discuss efficiency: In this case, that means any incentive created by the copyright regime is only a means by which
society encourages authors to create and share their works for the
advancement of knowledge, which ultimately allows for human
flourishing.
To many utilitarians, copyright is law only because it is recognized as such.125 An Aristotelian natural law perspective, on the
other hand, allows for positive instruments, while also accounting
for the need to promote society’s knowledge in the natural order of
the world. In the words of James Madison: “The copy right [sic] of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right
at common law . . . . The public good fully coincides . . . with the
claims of individuals.”126 Courts are not tasked with balancing private interests against public benefit, as some suggest.127 Rather,
copyright law facilitates the perfect and natural combination of
both single-handedly.
IV.

CORE COPYRIGHT CONCEPTS

A. Originality, Ideas, and Expression
As discussed in Part I, a Lockean account of natural law cannot
account for some of the most fundamental aspects of modern
American copyright law, including the originality requirement and
the idea/expression dichotomy. Because the teleological approach
is not dependent on labor, there is no conflict in refusing to grant
copyright protection to authors of unoriginal works even when they
have invested significant labor into them. Society has no need for
124

SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188 (“But [it is] important to see that Aristotle’s reason
goes beyond this utilitarian consideration.”).
125
See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1 (arguing that copyright is a “statutory tort,
created by positive law”).
126
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
127
See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015),
amended by 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 416 (2016); Leval, supra
note 17, at 1127.
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unoriginal works in its pursuit of knowledge.128 They deserve no
protection, as they contribute nothing to intellectual enrichment.129
Therefore, there is no reason to give authors a personal stake in
ideas already understood and articulated, and every reason to hold
others liable when they falsely claim to be the guardians of an idea
advanced by another. In a society where resources are distributed
according to what each individual deserves, she who contributes
nothing to the ultimate goal of copyright protection receives none.
B. Fair Use
Contemporary fair use jurisprudence provides the best example
of how a teleological understanding of copyright promotes the
progress of knowledge.130 In fact, fair use is so crucial to the fulfillment of copyright’s purpose that some courts have recognized that
the fair use of another’s copyrighted work is not merely a defense
to copyright infringement, but a right inherent in the Copyright
Act.131 The doctrine is outlined in section 107 of the Copyright Act,
which specifies that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not
an infringement of copyright.”132 The section also states that a use
is generally fair when it is made “for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research,”133 all of which contribute greatly to social discourse aimed
at increasing collective knowledge.
The issue for fair users, of course, is determining whether the
new work builds upon the idea embodied in the original work such
128

See Geller, supra note 121, at 64 (arguing that “[rote] copies feed nothing into
communication networks”).
129
See Leval, supra note 17, at 1111 (arguing that a work that “merely repackages or
republishes” is unlikely to serve copyright’s goal of promoting the progress of science).
130
See id. at 1110 (describing the fair use doctrine as a “necessary part of the overall
design” of copyright).
131
Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1133 (“Fair use is therefore distinct from affirmative defenses
where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse . . . .”);
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (arguing that fair
use is better viewed not as an excused infringement, but as a right granted by the
Copyright Act).
132
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The Ninth Circuit has gone even further to say that the
ability to make a fair use of another’s work is an independent right of the user. See Lenz,
801 F.3d at 1133.
133
§ 107.
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that it stands as a separate and original work expressing its own
idea.134 Judge Pierre Leval famously identified this so-called “transformative” tenet of fair use analysis as one that speaks directly to
the purpose-driven approach to copyright.135 Although the Copyright Act provides a four-factor test to assist in the determination
of whether a use is fair,136 the Supreme Court reinforced the importance of transformativeness in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
where it stated that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works.”137
Consider again Cariou v. Prince.138 Richard Prince, an appropriation artist,139 reused several of Patrick Cariou’s photographs taken
over the course of six years that Cariou spent living with Rastafarians in Jamaica.140 After making very slight alterations, Prince published them under his own name in New York art galleries.141 In
some instances, the court said, “Prince did little more than paint
blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.”142 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that twenty-five
of the thirty photos Prince appropriated were taken fairly.143
This decision cannot sit well with Lockeans who, with their reliance on labor, no doubt feel as if Cariou—who spent six years liv134

Leval, supra note 17, at 1110 (“Briefly stated, the use must be of a character that
serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction
without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”).
135
Although Judge Leval took a utilitarian perspective on this purpose, his view, as well
as the view of other utilitarians, can be reconciled with the hybrid natural law approach
presented here where the goal of copyright conditions society to achieve the higher order,
naturalistic goal of human flourishing. See supra Part III.
136
§ 107.
137
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
138
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
139
Appropriation art is “the practice of artists taking already existing objects and using
them, with little alteration, in their own works.” Hannah Jane Parkinson, Instagram, an
Artist and the $100,000 Selfies—Appropriation in the Digital Age, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2015,
5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/18/instagram-artistrichard-prince-selfies [https://perma.cc/F5RE-NRW4].
140
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 701.
143
Id. at 698.
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ing in Jamaica for the sake of his photography—unfairly lost out to
another artist with more notoriety who added a modicum of paint
to Cariou’s photographs.144 By severing the reliance on labor and
focusing on the true purpose of copyright to promote the progress
of knowledge, however, one can come to terms with the Second
Circuit’s conclusion: “Here, looking at the artworks and the photographs side-by-side, we conclude that Prince’s images, except for
those we discuss separately below, have a different character, give
Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics
with creative and communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”145 Assuming that the Second Circuit was correct in its belief that Prince’s works contributed new ideas to the information
marketplace, the court was right to find his use fair.146
The case of Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. also illustrates
how copyright law, through the fair use doctrine, serves to enhance
collective knowledge.147 There, the Ninth Circuit allowed a video
game competitor to copy computer software in order to develop an
industry standard.148 Combined with the fact that the Ninth Circuit
has recognized fair use as a distinct right in the Copyright Act, Sega
demonstrates how American copyright law grants a right of fair use
just as much as it grants the right to exclude—both for the sake of
intellectual enrichment.
C. The First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine, which the Supreme Court recently discussed in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,149 is also compatible
with the teleological approach to copyright. After Supap Kirtsaeng
144

See id. at 706 (“Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding
environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and
provocative.”).
145
Id. at 707–08.
146
Prince has since taken his art steps closer toward unfair use on the back of his
courtroom success. A recent gallery show portrayed Instagram photos taken by other
photographers. This time, Prince’s only contributions were “esoteric, lewd, emojiannotated comments made beneath the pictures.” Prince sold some of these photos for
up to $100,000. Parkinson, supra note 139.
147
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
148
See id. at 1518; see also Geller, supra note 121, at 62.
149
133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
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came to study at a U.S. university and encountered the exorbitantly
high price of college textbooks, he began selling copies of textbooks
purchased by his family at his hometown bookstore in Thailand.150
Because the books were considerably cheaper in Thailand than in
the United States, he captured the opportunity to make a significant profit by reselling them in the United States at a considerable
discount, as compared to other retailers.151 When the publishing
companies got wind of this, they brought a lawsuit against Kirtsaeng, alleging infringement of their distribution right.152 Kirtsaeng’s success in the case may be surprising, especially to utilitarians who rely so heavily on economic incentives as the only rationale underlying copyright. His victory may also unnerve Lockeans
because the publishing company no doubt made larger investments
(labor) in the sale of their textbooks than Kirtsaeng did.
Though it may not adequately capture either the utilitarian or
Lockean philosophy, the Supreme Court’s decision is perfectly
aligned with a teleological perspective. The first sale doctrine, as
articulated in the Copyright Act, provides that the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work is permitted to sell that copy
even without permission from the copyright owner.153 Although the
question presented before the Supreme Court focused on whether
the words “lawfully made under this title” place a geographical
restriction on the first sale doctrine,154 the Court emphasized that
such a restriction cannot comport with the American copyright system and its aim to facilitate the advancement of knowledge.155 Libraries, universities, art galleries, and other artistic and educational
institutions rely heavily on the doctrine for the continued operation
of their businesses.156 Beyond mere practicality, though, such a restriction is unnecessary to protect the ideas embodied in text150
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books.157 By contrast, a decision based exclusively on economics
would likely have been in favor of the publishing company, though
such a conclusion would have entirely evaded the purpose of
American copyright law. After all, the publishing company still retains a personal stake in curating the knowledge found within its
printed pages. Furthermore, Kirtsaeng’s conduct facilitated the
purpose of copyright by allowing for easier and cheaper access to
valuable information.158 The only burden an unrestricted first sale
bestows on a publisher is a forced reevaluation of its competitive
edge in today’s information economy.159 Unlike the utilitarian and
Lockean theories, a teleological account of copyright law presents
little or no conflict with the modern application of the first sale
doctrine.
D. Transfers of Ownership
The information economy puts special importance on understanding copyright ownership.160 Reconciling the transfer of a given
copyright with a teleological perspective is potentially problematic.161 This Note suggests that private property rights are justified by
the need to protect ideas embodied in artistic expression, and that
such protection is best provided by granting said property rights to
the originator of that expression. How then can an original author
assign her copyright to another person or company and still fulfill
her responsibilities as the guardian of the idea embodied in her
work?
157

Admittedly, the final outcome for Kirtsaeng has yet to be decided. The Supreme
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One potential explanation can be found in moral rights. The
Berne Convention recognizes, as other countries do, that copyright
ought to protect more than the rights of reproduction, distribution,
publication, and others listed in the Copyright Act.162 Instead, copyright ought to protect the “integrity” of the work,
which, as discussed, is where the idea embodied in the expression
truly lies.163 The answer for the Berne Convention, then, lies in the
fact that the right of integrity cannot be assigned, waived, or otherwise transferred, even if the author’s other “economic” rights
have been.164 Though the United States did not initially buy into
this facet of the Berne Convention, it later embraced it—albeit limitedly—when Congress passed VARA.165 Like the Berne Convention, VARA specifies that certain authors shall have rights of
attribution and integrity for their entire lives,166 regardless of
whether or not the other exclusive rights or copies of the works
have been transferred,167 though they can be waived.168
The distinction between the moral rights delineated in VARA
and the six exclusive rights provided by the Copyright Act is instructive.169 The former protects the work’s integrity—the heart of
the idea embodied in the expression170—and the latter protects
matters that are arguably ancillary, such as the right to control how,
when, and if reproductions are made, distributed, modified, and so
on.171 Decisions about these issues are without a doubt important
for protecting the work and its idea, but they can be made by anyone. Decisions about a work’s integrity, however, can only be made
by the original author. The “economic” rights are less, in a word,
integral to the overall purpose of copyright law and its aim to promote the progress of knowledge, which is perhaps why VARA re162

See supra Section III.B.
See Reddy, supra note 107, at 514 (noting that the right of integrity is considered by
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cognizes that moral rights are “independent” from the exclusive
rights of the Copyright Act.172 So long as authors retain the right to
protect the work’s integrity, they ought to be free to assign their
other rights to whomever they choose under a teleological framework.173
A transfer of copyright can therefore be consistent with the teleological view: Original creators would remain the guardians of the
original ideas embodied in their work even after relinquishing their
exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act.174 However, VARA
only applies to certain artists—namely, those that create works of
the visual arts.175 Such an extreme limitation is curious, especially
considering that the Berne Convention made no such restriction.176
The United States ought to expand its protection of moral rights to
reflect that of the Berne Convention, not just for the sake of fashioning a teleological justification of copyright, but simply because
authors of literary works, works of the performing arts, and musical
works, to name a few, also have an interest in protecting the integrity of their work.177 Given their meaningful contributions to social
education and understanding, there is no reason not to.
E. The Public Domain
The growth of the online information economy has put new
pressure on copyright laws. Advocates for a rich public domain argue that information, knowledge, and culture are locked up by the
existence and expansion of copyright and other intellectual property laws.178 Proponents of the “copyleft” movement argue for the
172
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total abolishment of the copyright regime on the ground that privatization effectuated by these exclusive rights prohibits certain individuals from participating in civil discourse.179 Even under a utilitarian or Lockean theory, these “leftists” are mistaken. But they are
especially incorrect under a teleological perspective.
Copyright laws do not lock up information; to the contrary,
they set it free.180 The whole purpose of copyright law, as discussed
in this Note, is to promote the advancement of knowledge. What
good would the system be if it locked up information? If there was
any credible evidence suggesting that the progress of knowledge
has somehow been impeded by the system designed to facilitate it,
the system would have been abandoned long ago. But technological
innovation and scientific understanding have grown exponentially
over the last two hundred years—a period that coincides with the
history of expansion of copyright and other intellectual property
laws.
More importantly, leftists fail to recognize two important
things. First, the protection of public domain materials is literally
written into American copyright laws in several ways: fair use, the
first sale doctrine, originality requirements, the idea/expression
dichotomy, and term limits, among others.181 These and other restrictions on the Copyright Act’s exclusive rights facilitate civic
discourse for the general advancement of social understanding.182
Second, although the law recognizes, just as Aristotle did, that society benefits from granting property rights to those individuals
who will cultivate the goods over which they exercise dominion,
the law also recognizes that there is no point in granting such ex179
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clusive rights if the social benefits are never realized. In the traditional sense, such goods were land and the natural world; today
these goods are information commodities.
The movement for a complete public domain can be generally
summarized as a refusal to pay for information that individuals
consume. Leftists cannot reconcile the thought of information
packaged and sold with their desire for an information utopia. The
solution for them, then, lies not in abolishing copyright law, but in
changing the way individuals think about and share information
with the community. Perhaps information should be entirely free.
But at what cost to its quality and availability?
CONCLUSION
Whether a grand unifying theory of copyright is truly possible is
admittedly questionable.183 However, rebuilding copyright from the
ground up with a teleological approach is not only consistent with
the core principles that make up the majority of the regime’s enforcement, it can also shed light on crucial questions that continue
to arise as society becomes more and more technologically dependent. Much more needs to be discussed, including: (1) whether the
inheritance of copyright by an original author’s heir comports with
the purpose of copyright,184 (2) whether software and other computer programs are best served by the copyright system or perhaps
better by the patent system,185 (3) whether and, if so, how copyright claims should be used to thwart competition,186 and (4) the
role intermediaries (such as online service providers) should play in
protecting the copyright of others.187
183
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For now, it is enough to remember that the protection copyright provides not only gives owners their due but also facilitates a
system for continuing greater social understanding and flourishing.
That is, after all, what the artistic works protected by copyright ultimately aim to do. It is about time the law comes around to fulfilling that end.

